Abstract-Silent data corruption (SDC) poses a great challenge for high-performance computing (HPC) applications as we move to extreme-scale systems. Mechanisms have been proposed that are able to detect SDC in HPC applications by using the peculiarities of the data (more specifically, its "smoothness" in time and space) to make predictions. However, these data-analytic solutions are still far from fully protecting applications to a level comparable with more expensive solutions such as full replication. In this work, we propose partial replication to overcome this limitation. More specifically, we have observed that not all processes of an MPI application experience the same level of data variability at exactly the same time. Thus, we can smartly choose and replicate only those processes for which the lightweight data-analytic detectors would perform poorly. In addition, we propose a new evaluation method based on the probability that a corruption will pass unnoticed by a particular detector (instead of just reporting overall single-bit precision and recall).
Ç

INTRODUCTION
S
ILENT data corruption (SDC) involves corruption to an application's memory state (including both code and data) caused by undetected soft errors, that is, errors that modify the information stored in electronic devices without destroying the functionality [21] . If undetected, these errors have the potential to be damaging since they can change the scientific output of HPC applications and mislead scientists with spurious results.
External causes of transient faults are usually rooted in cosmic ray particles hitting the electronic devices of the supercomputer. A study by Snir et al. [33] found that SRAM devices get hit once every 10 hours for 1 TB of capacity, latches every 41 days for 10 million units, and DRAM once every 40 days for 100k devices. As HPC systems keep scaling up, the increasing number of devices will make these external faults appear more often. Other techniques introduced to deal with excessive power consumption, such as aggressive voltage scaling or near-threshold operation, may also increase the number of errors in the system [8] . Moreover, software complexity (in the form of more complex operating systems and libraries) may also introduce corruptions throughout obscure and difficult-to-reproduce bugs [8] .
Substantial work has been devoted to this problem, both at the hardware level and at higher levels of the system hierarchy. Currently, however, HPC applications rely almost exclusively on hardware protection mechanisms such as error-correcting codes (ECCs), parity checking, or chipkillcorrect ECC for RAM devices [14] , [27] . As we move toward the exascale, however, it is unclear whether this state of practice can continue. For example, recent work shows that ECCs alone cannot detect and/or correct all possible errors [24] . In addition, not all parts of the system, such as logic units and registers inside the CPUs, are protected with ECCs. The reason is that ECCs, and other hardware protection mechanisms, utilize extra power, hardware area, and latency for the computation required to encode and decode the check bits [32] , making them also unlikely choices to be extended to other parts of an exascale system. Four major software solutions have been proposed by the community: (1) Full replication [18] , [26] , (2) algorithmbased fault tolerance (ABFT) [22] , (3) approximate computing [5] , and (4) data-analytic-based (DAB) fault tolerance [3] , [6] , [10] , [15] , [41] . ABFT and approximate computing are not general and have limited applicability, since both require to modify each kernel manually and only a subset of the kernels can be protected. Full process replication provides excellent detection accuracy for a broad range of applications. The major shortcoming of full replication is its overhead (e.g., spatial overhead of 100%+ for duplication, 200%+ for triplication). The DAB approach is a recent solution, where detectors take advantage of the underlying properties of the applications' data (the smoothness in the time and/or space dimensions) in order to compute likely values for the evolution of the data and use these properties to flag outliers as potential corruptions.
Although the DAB solutions provide high detection accuracy for a number of HPC applications with low overhead, their applicability is limited because of an implicit assumption-the application is expected to exhibit smoothness in its variables throughout its execution. Nevertheless, we have observed that not all the processes of parallel applications experience the same level of data variability at exactly the same time; hence, one can smartly choose and use more expensive detection methods (such as replication) in only those processes for which DAB detectors would perform poorly.
Another open issue is the need to standarize the evaluation of SDC detection methods. Currently, evaluation results are mainly reported in the form of single-bit precision and recall rates. We argue that there is a major problem with this type of reporting, namely, that it focuses exclusively on single-bit corruptions. As we show in Section 4, single-bit corruptions are the hardest ones to detect using software mechanisms (and the easiest ones to detect at the hardware level). Focusing solely on single-bit errors, we argue, makes it difficult to compare protection between different types of mechanisms working at different levels of the system hierarchy, such as comparing ABFT with full replication.
In this work, we make two new contributions for SDC detection in HPC. First is a new adaptive SDC detection approach that combines the merits of replication and DAB in order to significantly increase levels of detection recall in applications with sharp data changes (i.e., up to 99.9 percent), without incurring as much overhead penalty as in full replication. We propose two adaptive algorithms: One in which the number of processes replicated is fixed throughout the execution, and another where the number of processes replicated is allowed to change dynamically. Next, we propose a new evaluation method based on the probability that a corruption will pass unnoticed by any detector. In contrast to using overall singlebit precision and recall, this new evaluation allows us to compare our detection approach against mechanisms working at different levels of the system hierarchy-such as full replication-using a single metric.
Extensive experiments are conducted to compare our adaptive methods with full replication and DAB in terms of detection accuracy and space/time overheads. We use four applications dealing with astrophysics explosions from the FLASH code package [20] . These applications are excellent candidates for testing partial replication on applications dealing with explosions or collisions because the smoothness property, which is essential to guarantee the success of DAB solutions, is lost on the data of those processes through which the explosions' waves are passing through at that particular moment.
Our results show that our adaptive approach is able to protect the applications analyzed (99.9 percent detection recall) replicating between 23-83 percent of all the processes with a total overhead of 33-102 percent depending on the application (compared with 110 percent for full duplication).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe how DAB SDC detectors work. In Section 3 we introduce our adaptive methods for SDC detection. In Section 4 we describe the probabilistic evaluation metric used. In Section 5 we present our experimental results. In Section 6 we discuss related work in this area. In Section 7 we summarize our key findings and present future directions for this work.
DATA-ANALYTIC-BASED SDC DETECTORS
In this section we give an overview of data-analytic based methods and their major limitations.
Lightweight DAB SDC detectors are based on the observation that data evolution is smooth in the time and/or space dimensions in a range of variables in HPC applications [15] . They are composed of two major parts [6] , [15] . The predictor component computes a prediction for the next value of a particular data point. The prediction takes advantage of the underlying physical properties of the evolution of the data. After the prediction is done, the detector component decides whether the current value of the data point is corrupted. Since the predictions are always going to have some error, detection is done by checking whether the current value of the data is inside a confident interval surrounding the prediction. If it is not, it is considered to be a corruption.
For the time dimension, it was found that quadratic curve fitting (QCF) outperformed all the other considered options [6] . QCF uses the previous three time steps of every data point to compute the prediction for the current time step (see Equation (1)), incurring some memory overhead. In particular, the memory state is multiplied by 4x. That overhead, however, is calculated with respect to the memory state (the variables used to recover an execution from a checkpoint), which do not represent the whole memory consumed by applications. QCF is usually never above 90 percent overhead for HPC applications
Another way to do predictions is by using the spatial information instead of the temporal information. In [4] , 3D linear interpolation was used succesfully to predict values in a computational fluids dynamics (CFD) miniapplication. 3D linear interpolation is shown in Equation (2), where a prediction is made for the point situated at the ðx; y; zÞ coordinates. The prediction for each single coordinate is computed using the value of the line-at the position of the coordinate-passing through the points at both sides, i.e., points a (left/down) and b (right/up). The final prediction XðtÞ is the average of the prediction at each coordinate. Using spatial information has the benefit that no extra memory overhead is required, since only data for the current time step is used. Temporal predictors are usually more accurate than spatial ones, so choosing one or the other represents a memory overhead versus prediction accuracy tradeoff X x ðtÞ ¼ V x a ;y;z ðtÞ þ ððV x b ;y;z ðtÞ À V x a ;y;z ðtÞÞ Â x À x a x b À x a Þ X y ðtÞ ¼ V x;y a ;z ðtÞ þ ððV x;y b ;z ðtÞ À V x;y a ;z ðtÞÞ Â y À y a y b À y a Þ X z ðtÞ ¼ V x;y;za ðtÞ þ ððV x;y;z b ðtÞ À V x;y;za ðtÞÞ Â z À z a z b À z a Þ XðtÞ ¼ X x ðtÞ þ X y ðtÞ þ X z ðtÞ 3 :
To ease the reader with the notation used throughout this paper, we show in Table 1 the most important notations along with their description.
Once a prediction XðtÞ has been made, the detector decides whether the current value of the data V ðtÞ is a normal value by checking whether it falls inside a particular confident interval defined as [XðtÞ À d; XðtÞ þ d], where d equals to half the size of this interval. If it does not, we flag it as corrupted (a high level overview of DAB detectors is illustrated in Fig. 1 ). The value of d can be calculated by using the maximum prediction error from all data points in a process at t À 1 multiplied by a parameter: d ¼ Á e max ðt À 1Þ. This parameter determines a tradeoff between detection recall (how many real corruptions can we actually detect) and precision (how many of the detected corruptions are actually real corruptions). These metrics are defined in Equations (3) and (4) recall ¼ True Positives True Positives þ False Negatives :
For all the experiments in this work, the value for is chosen to have zero false positives given a particular execution size (i.e., precision = 100%).
When data values change too abruptly in a particular process, d becomes far too large to detect barely any corruption.
To illustrate the problem at hand, we show in Figs. 2a and 2b detection recall rates for single bit-flips injected on each bit position over two different processes in the variable pressure of the Sedov application during a particular period of time (100 iterations). Sedov is a hydrodynamical test code involving strong shocks and nonplanar symmetry [31] from the FLASH simulation code package. One can see how the wave of the explosion passing through rank 87 is making detection recall rates decrease substantially for this variable. 1 In contrast, detection recall is high in rank 99. To get a glimpse of how this data looks like, consider Fig. 3 . Here, we show the state of the maximum of variable pressure right after the window of 100 time steps has passed. In the figure, every square represents the data grid on a different rank.
ADAPTIVE METHOD
In this section we first describe the advantages and disadvantages of replication, focusing particularly on partial Paremeter to determine how often do we change the set of replicated processes. n Number of processes in an application.
B, r
Replication budget (number of processes to replicate). r is actually a rate, where r 2 ½0; 1 S Vector of scores for all processes. The higher the score for a process, the less smoothness in the data. a Factor used to control the size of the elastic budget.
Rate of a particular process MPE to that of the "worst" process during window w. C Parameter which defines a threshold for the rate z i , above which process i's data behavior is considered similar enought to that of the "worst" process. P f Probability of undiscovered corruption.
Oðr; wÞ
Overhead for a replication budget r and window w. 1. The rank of a process in MPI is its ID inside a group of processes. In this paper we consider only the rank of the general group to which all processes belong. In this sense, we use rank(s) or process(es) interchangeably.
replication. After this, we show the two adaptive algorithms we propose in order to choose what ranks to replicate in each application; the first algorithm, that we proposed in [7] , uses a fixed number of replicated processes (what we call a budget) while the second uses an elastic budget (i.e., the number of processes to replicate changes over time).
Overview
Replication is the best solution so far, in terms of detection recall, for dealing with data corruptions in scientific simulations. It has the benefit of not being affected by data behavior, since replication always makes sure that the output of all the replicas (or the majority of them) agree with each other bitwise. 2 Full replication, however, is generally considered too costly for HPC because of its high overhead both in the time and the space dimensions.
Partial replication is especially useful for applications for which sharp changes in the data occur only in a small subset of the MPI ranks, such as those involving explosions or collisions (e.g., Sedov). Considering again the example introduced in Section 2, we can see that duplicating rank 99 in this situation is a major waste of resources given that our lightweight detectors already do the job well. On the other hand, rank 87 can surely benefit from replication, making detection recall go from below 10 percent in the majority of bits to 100 percent in all of them automatically.
One way to detect corruptions efficiently by using replication, proposed by Fiala et al. [18] , is by comparing messages in MPI. The idea is that any corruption in the data of a particular MPI rank will ultimately produce corrupted messages that will be sent to other MPI ranks. By comparing messages from replicas of the same rank, one can determine whether that rank (or any of its replicas) got its data corrupted. This detection mechanism avoids the costly comparison of the data itself, which in some cases can be huge, although it generates extra messages in the network, and introduce some runtime overhead. However, multiple optimizations exist, such as only sending one full message from the original replica and hashes from all the others. A corruption, then, is detected at the destination by hashing the only whole message received and comparing all the hashes bitwise.
In this paper we adopt an adaptive strategy. For some ranks, we use partial replication, based on the method of Fiala et al. For the other ranks, we use the lightweight DAB detectors. The set of ranks to replicate (budget) is chosen carefully based on the data behavior in order to improve overall recall significantly (i.e., 100 percent), but with less spatial and temporal overhead. The ranks belonging to this set are changed dynamically during execution with a predefined frequency. In addition, the size of the budget can also be adjusted over time to accomodate for the situations where sharp data changes concentrate also in time.
In this work, we implement both algorithms-fixed and elastic budget -and compare them to DAB-only detection. In Section 3.2, the fixed budget algorithm is presented, and in Section 3.3 we discuss the elastic one.
Fixed Budget Algorithm
Before we can choose which ranks to replicate, we need a way to measure which ones would perform poorly with lightweight detectors. We find that using the maximum prediction error (MPE) among all data points in a rank is a good measure for this particular goal. MPE is computed as follows: After a prediction XðtÞ for a data point in a rank is done, the prediction error (computed as eðtÞ ¼ jV ðt) À XðtÞj) is compared-if a corruption is not detected-with the temporary maximum (we start with a value of zero). If it is bigger, then that prediction error is used and stored as the new temporary maximum. After going through all data points in a rank, the temporary maximum represents the MPE for time t. The reason why MPE is a good measure is that d (the confident interval) grows and adapts to the new data changes even if only a small subset of the data points in the rank experiences sharp variations. We did consider other measures, such as average prediction error. However, we found that the maximum error was the best. For example, the average is not fast enough to account for sharp changes in the whole rank, given the overwhelming weight that "normal" points have in the average calculation. 
for (i ¼ 0; i < n; i++) do 10:
end for 12:
if (iter % w = 0) then 13:
R sort(ranks(),S) 14:
REPLICATE TOP B RANKS FROM R 15:
S newArray(n Â ½0) 16:
end if 17: end if 18: end for
We implement the following strategy, shown in Algorithm 1, in order to select our replication set and to dynamically adapt it over time. After the first iteration, we choose a subset of processes to replicate, given the MPE in that first iteration (lines 5-8). The number of processes to replicate is determined by the replication budget B and it is fixed during the whole computation. During the following w application 2. This can work, of course, only for code-determenistic applications, since the same input should always produce the same output.
time steps (where w defines a window), we create an array S of size n, which is the number of processes in the application. After every time step, we sort all processes in ascending order given their MPEs (line 4) and add their positions in S (lines 9-11). For example, if at a particular time step, rank 12 is the one with the highest prediction error and there are 128 processes, then S½12 += 128. When w steps have passed, the score S represents an aggregation of the relative positions of each rank with respect to the others given their prediction errors during the window w. At this point (lines 12-16) we sort all processes by their score S, pick the top B (which is the allocated budget) as the new replication set, and reset S to start a new window again.
Elastic Budget Algorithm
When working with a fixed budget, we might replicate too many processes during some periods of the execution in order to compensate for peak periods of sharp data changes. The elastic method addressed the above issue, in which the number of processes that are replicated changes dynamically given the properties of the data. The main idea is that sharp data changes could be concentrated not only in a particular place in space but also in time.
In order to have an elastic budget, we need a way to measure, at a particular point in time, how many processes are behaving "bad enough" to merit replication. Like in the fixed budget case, we use the MPE for such a measure. Since data behavior greatly diverge between different data sets (even for the same application), we find that we can not use a fixed MPE amount as a threshold. Instead, we define a rate to compare a particular process MPE with that of the "worst" process. When this rate is above a defined threshold we say that the data behavior for that particular process is "similar enough" to the worst behaving process and, therefore, it is a good candidate for replication. This rate is described in
The same notations as in Algorithm 1 are used, changing MPE from a vector of size n to a matrix of size w Â n, where MPE ½j½i corresponds to the MPE of process i at time step j, where 0 j < w. R holds the processes' ranks (i.e., IDs) sorted in descending order by their score S (as shown in line 13 of Algorithm 1). Therefore, R½0 holds the rank of the worst behaving process during the time window w. Realize that the rate z i is a rate of two averages, i.e., the average MPE of process i divided by the average MPE of the "worst" process during window w.
The elastic method has to control the average number of processes replicated during the whole execution. This is needed for mainly two reasons. First, because we want to be able to compare-in terms of overhead-elastic versus fixed for different budgets. 3 The second reason is related to the fact that, when using the rate z i to discriminate processes, there is an upper limit in the size of the budget above which recall can not be improved. This occurs either because sharp data changes never happen in more than a particular number of processes, or because they are very concentrated in time. In these situations, and if the budget allows, it is advantageous to replicate more processes even when they do not "behave bad" (i.e., when lightweight SDC detectors have good performance).
Given this, we use the following strategy in order to keep the average number of processes replicated as close to a defined budget as possible. First, we define a total budget that is computed every time a new decision about replication needs to be made. This is shown in the following Equation:
where iter is the current iteration (i.e., time step) in the execution and B is the desired final average number of replicated processes. This Total Budget can be thought of as a "replication income" that we increase every w steps. We also define an accumulator Acc that keeps track of the actual total number of processes replicated from the beginning of the execution. This can be thought of as "incurred expenditures". Therefore, we can calculate our savings using
As long as we have that Saved Budget ! 0 at every time step, we know that we will never go above the budget. The problem now, however, is that we never know how much budget we need to save and when it is wise to expend it. If we never expend it, we may have missed opportunities to increase recall. On the other hand, if we expend it too early or before a period of massive sharp data changes, we may also get penalized in terms of recall gains. The only way to perfectly solve this problem would be to know the future. Since we can not do that, we use some heuristics to know when it is acceptable to spend the saved budget. The full approach is presented in Algorithm 2.
Algorihtm 2 is divided into two main parts. In the first (lines 6-16), the elastic budget and the vector S of scores (see Section 3.2 for details) are calculated. The elastic budget is calculated differently depending on whether we are in the very first iteration (lines 6-8) or we are at the end of a window of w time steps (lines 9-11). For the former, we call the function calcEB() (which calculates the elastic budget, described in Algorithm 3) with the parameter w ¼ 1 (there is only one row in matrix MPE). We also initialize the accumulator in line 8. For the latter, we recalculate R using the vector of scores S (the same way as we do in line 13 of Algorithm 1) and then calculate the elastic budget using the new R and the full matrix MPE (line 11). The vector S is computed during normal iterations (lines [12] [13] [14] [15] .
The second part of the algorithm (lines 18-31) deals with the replication of processes. In lines 19-23 we calculate the saved budget and the factor a, which is used to enlarge the elastic budget in the event that the saved budget grows to be greater than or equal to two times the total number of processes (this is the heuristic we use to expend the extra saved budget). If that is the case, the factor will be the integer division of the saved budget divided by the number of processes. In lines 25-27 we check that the elastic budget is never above the total number of processes. Finally, we 3 . When we talk about a budget in the elastic case, we refer to an upper limit in the average number of processes replicated during the whole execution.
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elastic budget calcEB(MPE,R; w; n) 12: else 13:
for (i ¼ 0; i < n; i++) do 14: 
elastic budget elastic budget þ 1 7:
end if 8: end for 9: return elastic budget 10: END FUNCTION Algorithm 3 shows the function calcEB(), which implements the calculation of the elastic budget. The function computes, for each process, its rate z i (line 4) as defined in Equation (5) . If the rate is above the threshold C (more on this in Section 5) then we say that this process' data behavior is similar enough to the worst behaving process and, therefore, it should be counted for the elastic budget.
PROBABILISTIC EVALUATION METRIC
There is no standarized way to evaluate SDC detection methods. Reporting overall single-bit precision and recall rates are commonly adopted. However, we argue this may not be enough to understand how well applications are actually protected. Consider the case where we have a mechanism with perfect detection recall for the 22 most significant bits of 32-bit numbers. What is the probability that, in this particular example, a corruption will evade the detector? Using the recall results and assuming 1-bit-flip corruptions only, we could say that 10=32 ¼ 0:3125 (31 percent of corruptions will pass undetected). But what if we get 2-bitflip corruptions? The probability in this case would be ð10=32Þ Â ð9=31Þ ¼ 0:0907 (9.07 percent corruptions will pass undetected). For our detector to be unaware of a 2-bitflip corruption in this case, all flips would always need to hit bits in the 10 less significant positions of the mantissa. In other words, a single bit-flip on position 20 is equivalent to a double bit-flip in positions 20 and 25. We could continue with the case for 3-bit-flips, for 4, 5, and so on. An interesting observation from this example is that, generally, the fewer bits that can get "flipped" in a system, the harder it is to detect corruptions using software mechanisms. Furthermore, another interesting question appears: What is the distribution of corruption sizes (in terms of the number of bits) in the system? Is a corruption affecting a large number of bits more or less common than one affecting just a few?
The key idea is that protecting the numerical data of simulations at this level (e.g., by using replication, algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) [11] , [22] , approximate computing [5] , or DABFT) is not so much protecting against particular bit-flips as it is protecting against numerical corruptions in the form of deviations from the original data. A corruption could happen anywhere in the system: CPUs, memories, buses, interconnections, file systems, operating systems, libraries, and so forth. Assuming that corruptions in the system, which can spread and affect numerical data in a large number of ways, will always manifest themselves as single-bit corruptions is a big assumption. Nevertheless, single-bit injection studies are still useful since injecting all possible corruptions (2 32 for single precision and 2 64 for double precision) is prohibitively expensive.
In this work we use an evaluation metric based on the probability that a corruption will pass unnoticed by a particular detector. Since we aim at designing general SDC detectors, we cannot assume that bit-flips in the less significant bits of the mantissa are harmless. For example, we performed a sensitivity study where we injected different corruption sizes on multiple applications (the full study is omitted because of space limitations). Two of those applications were from the Nek5000 code package [2] : Vortex, which solves an inviscid vortex propagation problem [19] , and Eddy, a 2D solution to the Navier-Stokes equations with an additional translational velocity [38] . We found that while Vortex is able to absorb all corruption sizes, producing an impact of less than 0.0002 (0.02 percent) 4 at the end of the execution, Eddy gets affected by even the smallest of corruptions, producing an impact of more than 0.4 (40 percent) in all cases. 4 . Impact is defined as the rate of deviation over the variable's total data range during the execution. For example, a deviation of 10 on a [0,200] range produces an impact of 0.05.
The evaluation metric, which we call the probability of undiscovered corruption, is defined as
where N is the number of bits per data point (i.e., 64), aveRec represents the average recall rate for all bit positions collected during our injection studies (see Equation (9)), and P ð#bits ¼ iÞ represents the probability that the corruption is exactly i bits long
The distribution P ð#bits ¼ xÞ depends on how corruptions in the whole system ultimately affect the numerical data of simulations. Because of the impossibility of calculating this distribution for a system as massive as a supercomputer, we assume four distributions representing the following four cases (shown in Fig. 4): (1) the number of bits affected is usually small, with 1 bit being the most common size (for this case, we use a Poisson distribution with ¼ 1:0); (2) all bit sizes are equally probable (i.e., P ð#bits ¼ xÞ ¼ 1=N); (3) all possible corruptions (2 N ) are equally probable (e.g., P $ N ð32:5; 13:05Þ for N ¼ 64); and (4) the number of bits affected is usually big, with N bits being the most common size (for this case, we use the inverse of distribution (1)).
EVALUATION
In this section, we first show the experimental setup and then discuss the results we obtain using the algorithms presented in Section 3.
Experimental Setup
For our experiments, we use four applications from the FLASH code package [20] in our experiments-Sedov [31] , BlastBS [42] , Sod [34] and DMReflection [12] -representing four different types of explosions. These applications are excellent candidates for testing different SDC detection methods on applications dealing with explosions or collisions. For these applications, the smoothness property [15] , which is essential to guarantee the success of DAB solutions, is completely lost on the data of those processes through which the different explosions are passing through at that particular moment. Implementations of MPI allowing replication at the process level, such as RedMPI [18] , do not yet support partial replication; they support only full replication (i.e., 2x, 3x, etc.); we simulate partial replication by considering precision and recall to be 100 percent for those processes that are part of the replication set.
Detection recall for each bit position is calculated by averaging the results over hundreds of random injections on the pressure variable in every process over thousands of time steps. These results only reflect detection over corruptions that end up affecting the state of the application. Corruptions that do not modify the application's state (directly or indirectly), are harmless from the application's point of view (at this level there is enough context to determine what memory is important). In the case of crashes caused by data corruption, they can be cathegorized as "hard errors" and are therefore out of the scope of this paper (any crashed application will not produce silently corrupted results since it will be run again from a previous healthy checkpoint).
For our experiments we set , which controls our dynamic confident interval d (see Section 2) to have exactly zero false positives. This is done by running each application multiple times (using various values for ) without corruption injection (but with detection activated) until zero false positives are achieved. Although this approach is not yet ready for production environments, our intuition tells us that the data properties of each variable-such as data ranges, autocorrelation coefficients, etc-, can be used to determine good values for . We leave this as a direction for future research.
We run the applications using 256 processes, and configure the data domain to be a two-dimensional grid.
The next two sections will use only a fixed budget algorithm. In Section 5.2 we only consider spatial overhead (i.e., % of replicated processes) in order to understand how each of the four distributions P ð#bits ¼ xÞ, as well as different values of the parameter w, affect the detection results. In Section 5.3 we include both temporal and spatial overhead, and again compare results for different values of w. Finally, experiments related to the elastic budget algorithm are presented in Section 5.4.
Detection Results
We report the results only of those experiments using linear interpolation (spatial) as our predictor. Similar results were obtained using a temporal predictor (QCF), so we omit them here. Fig. 5 presents the results of our injection study. Here, we fix the window w (see Section 3.2) to be 100 time steps. We can see the benefit of using partial replication for improving single-bit detection recall rates. For example, we observe an overall improvement for Sedov from 5 percent for 5 percent replication to 20 percent for 25 percent replication. For BlastBS we see an improvement of 6 percent for 5 percent replication and of 23 percent for 25 percent replication. In the case of Sod, we see significant gains, with improvements from 9 percent for 5 percent replication to 53 percent for 25 percent replication. Finally, for DMReflection we see an improvement of 6 percent for 5 percent replication and of 18 percent for 25 percent replication. 6 presents the results when using the probabilistic evaluation metric P f with the four distributions presented in Section 4. We note that the y-axis is plotted by using a logarithmic scale. We can categorize the distributions in a spectrum from difficult (dist1) to easy (dist4) (as discussed in Section 4, the fewer the number of bits that can get corrupted, the harder it is to detect corruptions at the software level). In this case, only distributions 1 and 2 are of further interest to us, since distributions 3 and 4 represent easy detection cases; that is, the probability of undiscovered corruption using our DAB detectors is already below 10 À15 without even considering replication. For distribution 2, we need over 20 percent of the processes replicated in order to achieve a 99.9 percent protection (i.e., P f < 0:001) level in the case of Sedov, 21 percent in the case of BlastBS, 67 percent for Sod, and 9 percent for DMReflection application. In the case of distribution 1, we need over 41 percent of the processes replicated in order to achieve a 99.9 percent protection level in the case of Sedov, 44 percent in the case of BlastBS, 87 percent for Sod, and only 25 percent in the case of DMReflection. Recall that distribution 1 is the most difficult one, representing an upper bound in the number of replicated processes needed. We believe that distribution 2, or some distribution between 1 and 2, may be closer to the true one.
In Fig. 7 we show the sensitivity of P f to the window parameter w. Since we are interested in getting an upper bound on the rate of replication for a given detection recall, we show only results using distribution 1 for P ð#bits ¼ xÞ (again, the hardest for detection). As we can see, the larger the window w, the higher the probability of undiscovered corruption P f . This result is not surprising given that the larger the window w, the higher the probability that the current replication set does not include the ranks with the highest data variability.
In general, we would be interested in partial replication only if, for a particular window w, we could get a good enough detection recall (i.e., P f < 0:001) with a tolerable overhead (i.e., at least strictly lower than that of full duplication). In the next section we show that this is in fact the case for the applications evaluated in this study.
Performance Overhead
Apart from the obvious performance overhead incurred by using replication (i.e., extra hardware needed to run extra processes, or spatial overhead), there is also an overhead introduced by extra messages sent throughout the network, which ultimately enlarges the runtime of applications. The DAB detector has a temporal overhead as it needs to run on every iteration and check all the data points for all the protected variables. From the system's point of view, both dimensions-temporal and spatial-contribute equally to the overall overhead, so both should be included. In partial replication we also need to consider the extra temporal overhead introduced by process migration when changing the replication set. We calculate the total overhead, then, using the following model:
Oðr; wÞ ¼ T ðrÞ Â ðr þ 1Þ þ Mðr; wÞ; (10) where r is the replication rate (e.g., 0.5 when replicating half of the processes), T ðrÞ is the runtime overhead introduced Fig. 5 . Single-bit detection recall results from our injection study. We use four applications (Sedov, BlastBS, Sod and DMReflection) running 256 processes, and we set w ¼ 100. Five partial replication rates (5, 10, 15, 20 and 25 percent) using the fixed budget algorithm are compared with DABonly nonreplication 2DINT (2D linear interpolation). Fig. 6 . Probability of undiscovered corruption when replicating a particular percentage of processes (fixed budget) using the four distributions P ð#bits ¼ xÞ described in Section 4. Note that the y-axis is plotted using logarithmic scale. The small subplots represent the data zoomed below 10 À15 .
by the DAB detector and partial replication when running with a replication rate equal to r (e.g., T ðrÞ ¼ 1:1 if there is a 10 percent increase in running time), and Mðr; wÞ is the overhead introduced by changing the replication set every w steps. Wang et al. [39] show that calculating process migration time as process memory=network bandwidth is a fairly good estimate. Given this, we calculcate Mðr; wÞ as
where mem is the memory used per process, r Â n is the replication budget (n is the number of processes), W represents the aggregate network bandwidth in the system, and T w is the time taken to run w steps in the original application. Note that this is an upper bound, since in some cases the number of processes to replicate is less than the budget, namely, when some processes replicated in the previous window are chosen again for the current one. We find that in only a few cases does the replication set change completely.
The temporal overhead T ðrÞ may vary depending on the communication-to-computation ratio of the application. For those cases where computation dominates communication, the extra overhead is usually small. Fiala et al. [18] show that temporal overhead for full duplication (i.e., r ¼ 1:0) is not a concern (around 1-2 percent) for those applications that can maintain a well-balanced communication-to-computation ratio as they scale (applications exhibiting weak scalability). On the other hand, temporal overheads can reach 30 percent for network-bound applications and kernels. Since we are simulating partial replication, we are unable to measure exactly the value of T ðrÞ for the applications used. In this case, we assume the temporal overhead introduced by the extra network messages never to be above 5 percent, given that the stencil codes evaluated are not network-bound. Moreover, our experiments indicate that the temporal overhead introduced by using our DAB detectors is never above 6 percent. 5 Thus, we set T ðr ¼ 1:0Þ ¼ 1:11 (i.e., 5 þ 6 ¼ 11% temporal overhead introduced by replicating all processes and using our DAB detector on every process). We estimate T ðrÞ for r < 1:0 assuming a balanced communicaton pattern between processes (which is the case in the stencil codes evaluated, where processes communicate mainly with their neighbors):T ðr < 1:0Þ ¼ 1 þ r Â 0:05 þ 0:06.
In order to get an idea of how much overhead would be introduced by partial replication, we compute the values of P f in Fig. 8 based on OðrÞ, instead of just spatial overhead (i.e., % of replicated processes), for different values of the parameter w. Moreover, we assume distribution 1 for P ð#bits ¼ xÞ (see Fig. 4 ) since it is the hardest with respect to detection (see Section 4), getting an upper bound on the overhead needed for a particular desired protection level. All the injection experiments are run on the Fusion cluster at Argonne National Laboratory [1] , which has an InfiniBand QDR network with a bandwidth of 4 GB/s per link, per direction, arranged on a fat tree topology. Since we are not taking into account network contention issues in our overhead model, we set W to the lowest possible aggregate bandwidth in order to get an upper bound on the effect that the network bandwidth has on the overhead. That is, we set W = 4 GB/s.
As we can see, the trend between the different curves stays similar to that of Fig. 7 . A window of a 100 time steps is the best choice among all the considered possibilities. The reason is the accuracy loss incurred when using larger window sizes. Even if the temporal overhead can be reduced significantly, the loss in accuracy implies that we need a bigger rate of replication to cover those ranks for which our lightweight detectors perform poorly. The bigger rate of replication means a much bigger spatial overhead, which overshadows the reduction in temporal overhead by the smaller frequency of memory transfers throughout the network. Our analyses show that we can have a 99.9 percent protection (i.e., P f < 0:001) with w ¼ 100 with a total overhead of around 1.53 (53 percent) for Sedov, 1.56 (56 percent) for BlastBS, 2.07 (107 percent) for Sod, and 1.34 (34 percent) for DMReflection, with a replication rate of 41, 44, 87 and 25 percent respectively. This is an improvement, over full duplication (considering 5 percent in temporal overhead due to the extra network messages, full duplication has a total overhead of 2.1, or 110 percent), of 52 percent for Sedov, Fig. 7 . Sensitivity of P f (Fig. 6) to the window parameter w. In this case, we use only distribution 1 (see Fig. 4) ; the small subplots represent the data zoomed between [0.0,0.004].
5. The memory overhead of our DAB detectors is practically 0 percent given that we are using spatial-based predictors only in this study. For that reason, we do not include extra memory usage in the overhead calculation.
49 percent for BlastBS, only 3 percent for Sod, and 69 percent for DMReflection, with a detection recall close to 100 percent.
Elastic Budget
The first step in the evaluation of Algorithm 2 is to set a proper value for the parameter C, which controls how close the MPE of a particular process should be to the MPE of the "worst behaving process" in order to be considered for the elastic budget (as shown in Algorithm 3). We start by setting C to 1=2, 10 À1 , 10 À2 , and so forth, until we can no longer achieve better recall results (or we get worse recall). This gives us a value of C ¼ 10 À6 . In Fig. 9 we show the sensitivity of P f to different values of C, comparing them to the best solution obtained using the fixed budget algorithm (represented as black curves). We can see from these plots that the added benefit of using elastic varies greatly depending on the application. For example, we can see that we can achieve a P f < 0:001 for the Sedov application replicating only 23 percent of the processes (on average) instead of the 41 percent needed in the fixed budget case, a 45 percent improvement. In the case of BlastBS, however, the gain is smaller: 40 percent replication instead of 44 percent. The gain is also modest in the case of Sod, with a 83 percent replication in the elastic case compared to a 87 percent in the fixed case. With DMReflection we even lose some recall, needing 33 percent of replication in the elastic case versus only 25 percent in the fixed case for the same recall of 99.9 percent (this is due to a more uniform distribution of sharp data changes along the time dimension in DMReflection, which also explain the good performance of the fixed budget algorithm in the first place).
Nevertheless, and as we will show in the overhead experiments (Fig. 11) , the gains obtained using the elastic budget algorithm in some applications are greater for smaller values of recall. The suitability of one algorithm versus the other depends on the desired protection level.
In Fig. 10 we show the real size of the elastic budget at each time step (and its average) during the full run of the four applications studied in this paper. The allocated budget is carefully chosen in order to have at least a 99.9 percent recall in each application. As we can see, our algorithm is able to use almost all the allocated budget, which means that our mechanism (described in Algorithm 2) works well at keeping the actual average close to the allocated budget.
Finally, in Fig. 11 we compare the best results of fixed budget versus the best results of elastic budget in terms of (Fig. 6) to the parameter C in the elastic budget case, compared with the best solution of the fixed budget algorithm. Distribution 1 is used for P ð# bits ¼ xÞ; the small subplots represent the data zoomed between [0.0,0.004].
total overhead as described in Equation (10) . Again, we see that the curves follow a similar trend to that of Fig. 9 , where results vary greatly by application. If we focus solely on overheads for P f < 0:001, for example, the Sedov application can achieve such a level of recall in the elastic case with an overhead of just 1.33 (33 percent) instead of 1.53 (53 percent) in the fixed case; in BlastBS we go from a 1.56 overhead using a fixed budget, to a 1.51 using an elastic one; in the case of Sod, we obtain 2.01 in elastic versus 2.06 in fixed; and in DMReflection we get penalized and the overhead goes from 1.34 in fixed to 1.43 in elastic.
For situations where we do not have such a high demand in recall, however, the elastic-based algorithm can dramatically reduce overhead as compared to the fixed-based one. For example, in the case of a 99 percent recall (P f < 0:01),
we have a reduction in overhead from 1.38 to 1.27 for Sedov, a reduction from 1.4 to 1.3 for BlastBS, from 1.93 to 1.86 in the case of Sod, and a reduction from 1.23 to 1.21 in the case of DMReflection. For easy comparison, these results are listed in Table 2 .
RELATED WORK
Replication mechanisms for fault tolerance have been studied extensively in the past, especially in the context of aerospace and command and control systems [9] , [13] , [30] , [40] . Traditionally, the HPC community has considered replication to be too expensive to be applicable; and, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been implemented in any real production system. Elliott et al. [16] , Engelmann et al. [17] , and Stearly In the latter, an f indicates results using the fixed budget while an e indicates results using the elastic budget. Also for our adaptive solution, two cases are shown corresponding to two protection levels: 97 and 99.9 percent recall, respectively. et al. [35] show that future exascale HPC systems can benefit from full replication (2x and 3x) because it can reduce the probability of hard failures substantially (i.e., for an application to fail, there needs to be a failure in a rank and all its replicas in a very short window of time). This, in turn, improves utilization by lowering the frequency of checkpointing. Nevertheless, other recent works on improved C/R mechanisms, such as hierarchical C/R, seem to solve this problem without having to duplicate-or triplicate-the resources needed to run an application. In any case, the problem of dealing with hard failures is out of the scope of this paper. Liu et al. [25] propose partial replication in time by taking advantage of the fact that soft errors in the first 60 percent of iterations of some iterative applications are relatively tolerable. The idea is to duplicate all processes only during the last 40 percent of iterations. Nakka et al. [28] , Subasi et al. [36] , and Hukerikar et al. [23] -by introducing new programming language syntax-propose to make the programmers responsible for identifying those parts of the code or data that are critical and need to be replicated. In contrast to these solutions, which are application dependent, our work is more general in the sense that we do not require any specific knowledge of tolerability to errors of particular iterations, variables, or code regions.
Partial replication in HPC where processes are chosen at random has also been investigated. Research has shown, however, that such an approach does not pay off [35] . In this work we choose the processes to replicate based on their data behavior.
In the realm of GPUs, Tan and Fu [37] propose using idle cycles in stream multiprocessors to re-execute wraps. The authors compare their results to discover corruptions. Our work aims at protecting application data no matter where it is processed. For example, if the application combines CPUs and GPUS (using GPUs just for specific computational kernels), GPU-based schemes can be used along with DABFT solutions, since the data computed in the GPUs ends up, at some point, affecting the application's state stored in main memory. This same property applies to any other protection mechanisms aimed at specific hardware devices.
New exascale designs are emerging that have GPUs as the main computational unit-which helps create a more power efficient architecture for throughtput-intensive applications-by creating faster CPU-GPU links and merging CPU's and GPU's memory spaces. Two examples of this type of architecture are the Summit and Sierra Supercomputers [29] , which tightly integrates IBM POWER CPUs with NVIDIA GPUs using the NVIDIA NVLink high-speed interconnect. Our DABFT solutions can still be used for time-stepped HPC applications under this architecture as long as the application's state stored in memory can be accessed after each time step.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have presented adaptive methods, namely a fixed budget method and an elastic budget method, for general software level silent data corruption detection of parallel applications. Our adaptive methods combine partial replication along with DAB detectors to get SDC protection levels that are close enough to those achieved by pure duplication (2x replication) at a lower overhead price. In addition, we have demonstrated that using an elastic budget for partial replication can be useful for situations where sharp data changes are concentrated not only in a particular place in space but also in time.
We have also conducted extensive evaluation of the adaptive detection methods against existing data analytic based detection and replication in terms of detection accuracy and overall overhead. Our evaluation is based on four applications dealing with different types of explosions, which are excellent candidates for testing partial replication on applications dealingwith explosions or collisions. Moreover, to effectively evaluate various detection methods, we have proposed an evaluation metric based on the probability that a corruption will pass unnoticed by a particular detector. Instead of evaluating detectors solely on overall single-bit precision and recall rates, which are not enough to understand how well applications are actually protected, this single metric allows us to directly compare SDC detectors against mechanisms with perfect precision and recall, such as full duplication. Our results show that our adaptive approach is able to protect the applications analyzed (99.9 percent detection recall) replicating between 23-83 percent of all the processes with a maximum total overhead of 33-102 percent depending on the application (compared with 110 percent for pure duplication).
While an elastic budget solution provides several benefits over a fixed budget solution in some situations (i.e., when sharp data changes are concentrated not only in a particular place in space but also in time), the elastic solution cannot be directly implemented in the current state-of-theart HPC systems due to the lack of dynamic resource allocation support on existing HPC platforms. Nevertheless, one can image a scenario in future exascale computing where systems will have spare resources, in our case nodes, which will be allowed to be requested "on the fly" by applications and libraries in order to perform fault tolerance tasks.
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